The Metaphysics of Games

If you really dislike philosophy you should skip this post. It is not necessary for understanding subsequent posts and may just confuse you if you do no have philosophical leanings. But, for those who may be interested, I thought I would write a few words about the metaphysics of games.

Perhaps one of the most enduring and perplexing problems in metaphysics arises from the seemingly simple question - how do you know a tree is a tree? The problem here is that we have a specific thing that we assign to a group or category. We use the word "tree" for both the category and the individual instances that populate that category. In metaphysical terms the individual instance is referred to as a particular, and the category is referred to as a universal. In normal conversation we do not distinguish between particulars and universals, as that would just make conversation awkward. But, if we were being precise, the above question would be qualified - how do we know a tree (particular instance) is a tree (member of the universal category).

But, where do these universals come from? And how do we know a particular instance belongs to a category? Are categories defined bottom up based on common attributes? If so how do we select the attributes? Or are categories defined top down based on essences? If so, how do we determine the proper essences? These questions make up one of the most vexing problems in metaphysics known as The Problem of Universals.

Philosophers as far back as Plato and Aristotle have attempted to tackle this problem. In the last century, Ludwig Wittgenstein offered an interesting perspective using a family resemblances analogy and used games as an example category. If you go to a family reunion, you can see that the members of the family share some facial features. But, not everyone has the same set of common features. For example, a few people may have the family nose. Others have the family chin. Perhaps others have the family brow. The family is held together visually by a collection of interlocking facial features but no family member has the full set of common features. According to Wittgenstein, many concepts are held together in the same way.

In the case of games, we see a category held together by family resemblances. Some games have a strategy. Some games have winners and losers. Some games involve competition. And so on. But no game has a full set of common attributes. This assertion that 'games' is a poorly defined category would hold for nearly a century, until Bernard Suits would offer a precise definition of games. We will get to Suits in the next post. But for now we will leave it off by saying that the intellectual foundations of games is anchored deeply in the heart of metaphysics.

Some Distinctions

Before this all starts getting too far out of hand, I think I'd better start making some distinctions. An objective within a game and the game itself are not the same thing. A game and a game world are not the same thing. A virtual game world is different from a non virtual game world. A virtual (game) world can be entirely fantasy or have connections of some kind with the real world. And products, such as football jerseys that exist and have value because of the game, are not part of the game but are clearly dependent on it.

Let's take the first of these distinctions. I will use foot ball in these examples because more people are familiar with football than are familiar with, say, World of Warcraft. In football, there are any number of objectives within the game itself. An objective, in football, may be to advance the ball ten yards to get a first down or to prevent the other team from doing so. Another objective may be to score a touchdown. Clearly, the first of those is a a sub-objective to the second one. One could see the touchdown as a sub-objective to winning the game; winning the game as a sub-objective to making the play-offs; and making the play-offs as a sub-objective to winning the Superbowl. So analysis of objectives can get quite complicated. However, my unit of analysis is the game and I can't see (at least at the moment) how developing a structure for objectives within or beyond the game itself advances my understanding of games. It may advance my understanding of football, but not of games.

In football, we have a clear unit of analysis that we call 'the game'. At the risk of being simplistic, it is four fifteen minute play intervals at the end of which there is a score indicating a winner or a tie. I understand all that business about overtime, elapsed time and so on. But, as I said, we are not analyzing football here and I think most people understand what a 'game' of football entails.

In World of Warcraft this is not nearly as clear. Exactly what is 'the game' in WoW? This could get complicated; but I will keep chipping away at it.

Is It a Game?

William Sims Bainbridge, who I mentioned in the last post, says that World of Warcraft is not game. In his words, "World of Warcraft is far more than a game" [pg. 9] Based on a discussion preceeding that remark, one might speculate that he sees it as a virtual world. I would certainly agree with that observation but would also point out that while the term 'game' is limiting, the term 'virtual world' is limiting as well. Second Life, for example, is a virtual world, but it would be a stretch to call it a game. Bainbridge says that WoW is a virtual world that contains games and I would agree with that observation. However, we need a term specifically for virual worlds that contain games to distinguish them from virtual worlds that do not contain games. The term 'game world' comes to mind but is entirely unsatisfying.

This may seem nit picky and it probably is. However, for the purposes of research, it is necessary to define things correctly. There are things that are true of games that are not true of game worlds. There are things that are true of game worlds that are not true of games. There are things that are true of virtual worlds (e.g. Second Life) that are not true of game worlds (e.g. World of Warcraft).

World of Warcraft has features that are not part of other game worlds. For example, there is body of literature (well paperback books) that provide an elaborate backstory and narrative for World of Warcraft. And WoW contains endless symbols, archetypes, and hidden meanings that make it a target of critical study unlike most other examples of the game world genre.

To get back to basics here for a second, when we are doing research on games, video games, game worlds, or whatever, we need precised defined terms that refer to similar objects with similar attributes. Thus far the explosion of possibilities in video games seems to be frustrating all efforts. However, we shall just have to try to stay on top of it.

Conceptual Bleeding

I started this blog attempting to provide some philosophical grounding for video game research. I discussed concept analysis and how it applied to the concept of games. I explored the notion of play and how it is one of the few, if not the only, activity that we pursue for its own sake. I took that a step further and introduced the concept of flow and explained how video games are a quintessential flow activity. So far so good. But then my focus began to drift. This is not a lament, only an observation. You can't ignore all the other things that are going on. At the same time you cannot be too distracted by them. Video games can be seen as art. They can be used for education. The can provide channels for advertising. They can provide critical commentary. In fact, video games are useful for a whole lot of things.

I mention this because it is a good example of the kind of conceptual bleeding that plagues researchers. We begin by trying to develop a crisp essential concept of the phenomenon that we are trying to study. Over time that phenomenon begins to bleed into other areas. If we stick to our essential definition then, over time, we begin to appear irrelevant. If we expand the scope of our phenomenon to include new uses or applications the concept begins to appear somewhat fuzzy over time which ultimately threatens our rigor.

As I said, this is not a lament. Only an observation. It is a good example of a conceptual problem that many researchers encounter. So, what am I going to do about it? Well, probably nothing. I intend to keep looking at new uses of video games and I intend to keep trying to nail down the essential concepts. And I intend to keep reflecting on what I am doing. I am probably not going to write the book on video games nor am I going to have the last word. This is a blog and the best I can hope for is to make a few interesting observations along the way.

Reflecting and Refocusing

Many years ago, when I worked in a government office, there was sign that circulated which many people would pin to the walls of their cubicle. The sign began with an articulation of the ideal expectations for employee behavior and ended with the observation "but when you are up to your ass in alligators, it is easy to forget that your goal was to drain the swamp." This seems to have broader applicability as we get into any number of situations where dealing with the dynamics of the situation distracts us from the very reason that brought us into the situation.

As we explore the philosophical foundations of games and the various analytical and linguistic subtitles, we are vulnerable to the same phenomenon. So, let us pause for a moment to reflect on what we have done and where we would like to go with it.

We have defined the concept of a game. We have constructed a universal. Ideally, this universal includes all things that are games and no things that are not games. The Aristotelian approach of defining games did not work because games do not have attributes like rocks, plant and trees that were developed over years of evolution. We have taken a more Platonic approach in attempting to discover the essence of "gameness", not in the World of Forms but in the world of abstract ideas. Abstract ideas are ideal when they are intellectually economical.

We needn't worry about Hume and Wittgenstein because we are not trying to account for all conversational uses of the word "game". Bacon steered us away from that in his warning about Idols of the Marketplace. Our goal was to find a definition of games that reflected the essence of games not the variety of uses of the word. We did this because we want the particulars within our universal to be the 'same' thing. We want this because the extent to which they are the same the more we can learn about them. So, if we have to toss out some particulars as not really being games, this is the cost of gathering more knowledge about those that are games.

As we proceed with out analysis, we may wish to refine the definition. However, unlike the philosopher who would refine the definition to give it greater coverage, the researcher would refine the definition so that it works better for research purposes. That is, we would refine the definition if that refined definition would help us to learn more about the particulars contained in the universal.

Games, Play and Fun

It seems pretty obvious to say that we play games because they are fun. This however, introduces two related concepts that are associate with games but not games. We play games but games are not the only form of play. Kids play make believe, or dress up or cops and robbers. None of these are games as they do not have goals and rules. But they are played nonetheless. Not all games are 'played'. Professional sports, for example, are work. We may use the term play to describe the activity. But, it is work. Suit's definition of playing a game as a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles does not apply easily to professional sports. It is no longer voluntary when one is getting paid.

Making further distinctions, not all play is fun and fun can be derived from activities other than play. For example, an amusement park ride may be fun or meeting up with old friends my be fun, but neither could be considered play. Looking at it from the other perspective, a game may cease to be fun if one is loosing badly.

I am making these distinctions because play, games, and fun are often linked in much of the literature that I have read thus far. Clearly they are related concepts but they are not the same thing. Both play and fun deserve closer scrutiny but are distractions at the moment. So, I am going to set them aside definitionally and hopefully get back to them later.

It seems that play is some sort of a rehearsal activity. We pursue thing in a non serious way so that we can develop necessary skills for serious situations. Games are a very structured form of rehearsal but not all rehearsals are structured. Puppies fighting is a good example of play that is not a game. Further, it seems that fun is the reward for rehearsing. The reward of fun can be achieved through other means such as spending time with old friends. But the reward of fun makes play and hence games inherently satisfying.

There is a great deal more to both fun and play than I have time to get into at the moment. But, I needed to set them aside because they occur so frequently with the concept of games.

Games, Goals and Rules

As we look more closely at the internal structure of a game we see that games have a goal of some kind and a collection of rules governing the behaviors that one can engage in to achieve the goal. So, for example, in a football game, the goal is to score more points than the opponnent by getting the ball into the end zone more times. (This is not to diminsih field goals and extra points. It is just to make the analysis simpler). In getting the ball into the end zone, the team must achieve this goal using prescribed means. If you were to drive a tank down the field or gun down all the members of the defensive line, getting into the end zone would be much easier. But football has rules which say that these tactics are not acceptable.

The goal has to be worthy and achievable. If the winner in football were defined as the first team to score 100,000 more touchdowns than its opponent, few people would engage in the game. But the goal of more points within a limited time frame seems reasonable.

The rules also have to be reasonable. They have to make achievement of the goal challenging and satisfying without making it frustrating. So, if one of the rules of football were that players had to have their feet tied together, nobody would wish to play it.

In addition, as you strive for the game goal according to the game rules, you get better at the game and the satisfaction of playing the game increases.

So, Suit's definition of a game as a "voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles" might be slightly restated as an attempt to achieve a challenging and satisfying, but unecessary goal using challenging and satisfying but unecessary means. The goal here is not simply the game goal, but achieving the game goal using the means allowed in the game.

Next we will consider degrees of "gameness' looking at some quintessential examples, some borderline examples, and some bad examples.

Distinctions and Refinement

Suits' definition that playing a game is a "voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles." seems like a pretty good one. It seems to capture the essence of what playing a game is all about. But we are far from done. For example, it appears that a game is an object of play but not the same thing as play. Can you play something that is not a game. Can a game be experienced through anything other than play. What is the difference between work and play? Can a game be work?

Taking this a step further we can ask - if a game is a "voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles" how do those obstacles arise? Why would anybody attempt to overcome them? It seems that these obstacles arise from the fact that the game has a goal and a set of rules for achieving that goal. But there are lots of things that have goals and rules which are not games. For example, in your career, your goal may be to get to the top and one of the rules is that you can't just shoot everyone to get there. So, is your career a game?

And why would anyone engage in a game. Clearly, in your career plan, you are pursuing it for very tangible rewards - more pay, more prestige, a bigger office, whatever. And yet in the game it is merely the satisfaction of winning. Is there something inherently satisfying about playing a game that is a reward in and of itself. If we play games for their own sake while we always work for the sake of something else, doesn't that make playing games a superior activity?

The more questions we answer, the more questions arise. Sigh! This is the essence of the project of knowledge. We merely become more and more aware of how much we do not know. Socrates was referred to as the wisest man alive by the Oracle at Delphi. He responded by saying that his wisdom was derived from the fact that he realized how little he knew. But, don't reach for the hemlock yet. We will return to Suits in a little more depth and try to get a little more structure on our concept of a game.

The Grasshopper

In a delightful book entitled The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, Bernard Suits explores the concept of a game. This book is a stunning piece of work for three reasons. First, he achieves what Wittgenstein failed to do. He manages to define the concept of a game. Second, it is an excellent example of the process of concept analysis as the grasshopper attempts to define the concept of game and then defend it against challenges. Third, it provides some profound insights about both life and games.

On the first point, Wittgenstein not only failed to come up with an adequate definition of the concept of games, he proved (or thought he had proved) that such a definition was not possible. Yet Suits defines playing a game as a "voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles." [pg. 55] This is not the formal definition and one would have to read the book to understand Suits' definition more fully. But, it does capture the essence of playing a game. How did Suits get this right where Wittgenstein got it wrong? I believe that the answer lies in the fact that Wittgenstein was looking for attributes - rules, players, strategies, and so forth. Suits' definition is teleological. It defines games in terms of the purpose they serve. Aristotle's final cause was the purpose for which a thing exists. And, according to Aristotle, you must understand the final cause in order to understand a thing. Sadly, teleology has fallen out of favor. And, yet, it is clear that you cannot define the concept of game without reference to the purpose for which they are played.

On the second point, Suits provides us with an excellent example of concept analysis, a technique that is often woefully missing from social science research and almost unheard of in business research. Using commonplace understandings of concepts in research is as destructive to good research as is replacing statistical analysis with 'gut feel' or replacing methodology with mere curiosity. This was, in fact, the essence of Bacon's Idols of the Marketplace. Bacon saw, way back in the 17th century, that using commonplace understandings of concepts was destructive to the project of science. And yet, today, we do it all the time. Sadly, there are far too few examples of good concept analysis and Suits provides us with an exemplar.

On the third point, games are one of the few activities that we pursue for their own sake. This means that they have intrinsic rather than instrumental value. Aristotle pointed out that happiness is the only goal we pursue for its own sake. Now, Suits is pointing out that playing games is an activity that we pursue for its own sake. Is there a connection between happiness, games and the ideal life? I think so, but it would be way too premature to suggest that. Let's see how things unfold.

Universals Crash and Burn

As we observed in the last post, John Locke attempted to update Aristotle's view of universals by saying that we select key attributes for defining categories based upon our objectives. So, we can look at games, decide what salient features they all have in common and define the concept of game based upon those features. It looks like the project might be gaining altitude again. But, instead it will take a nosedive.

David Hume would observe that we form categories based on a subconscious cognitive process that cannot be made explicit. That is, we go about our business in the world, experience games, and form a visceral concept of what a game is. Any attempt to explicitly define characteristics would be artificial and doomed to failure. The Supreme court justice who admitted that he could not define pornography but claimed - "I know it when I see it", was embodying Hume's view of universals.

If Hume steered the project into a nose dive, Wittgenstein let it crash and burn. According to him, the only thing the elements of some categories have in common is that they are members of the same category. He used a, now famous, analogy to family resemblances. If you go to a family reunion and look at the members of the family you will see common elements. Some will have the family eyes. Some will have the family nose or mouth. Some the family brow. And so on. There are overlapping features held by subsets of the family but no set of features common to all. For example, not everyone has the nose. Or not everyone has eyes. Universals, according to Wittgenstein, are made the same way. You cannot define a core set of attributes because there is no core set of attributes that all instances have in common. And the concept he used to illustrate this was - you guessed it - games!

Should we despair at this point and give up our attempt to define what constitutes a game? Should we despair that if this is true knowledge is not really possible? No, that would be a little overly dramatic. Instead we will back up and see where these great minds went wrong. We will go back to some road signs provided by Bacon and Aristotle and try to get back on the right path. And that will be the topic of the next post.

The Decline of Universals

Aristotle saw universals as constructs based in reality. A tree is a tree because it shares key attributes with other trees. Anybody can look at a tree and a squirrel and see that they are not the same thing. Initially this seems to solve the problem. But in the long run it only makes it worse. It answers the question - where do universals come from? - by saying that they are constructed based upon common attributes. However, it then leads to the question - where do attributes come from? If the squirrel happened to be brown, we could create a universal "brown things" to which the tree and the squirrel would belong. Aristotle might balk at this by citing that "brown" is not an essential attribute and universals should be formed based on common essential attributes. This sounds good and it seems like we are making progress. But, we are not. How do we know that an attribute is essential? Is an attribute essential because it is in the definition of kind? Or is an attribute in the definition of kind because it is essential? That whirring sound in the background is our cognitive wheels spinning in the philosophical mud.

Locke made some progress by saying that the creation of universals involves a cognitive process of abstraction whereby we we select attributes based on some set of objectives. I am going to jump in and help Locke out here by saying that our objective is usually intellectual economy. We create categories because they are efficient ways to organize our knowledge. Otherwise, we get into huge trouble with Locke. We get into trouble because it raises questions such as 1) how do we select objectives?, and 2) how do we know that a particular category is better than another category at meeting those objectives?

Locke has both helped and hindered the pursuit of universals. He has helped in that his claim is intuitively appealing. It does seem to be the case that we look at a collection of particulars and though some cognitive process extract a group based on similarities. In fact, it feels so built in that one has to wonder if it is just a function of the brain. He has hurt in that it has made our understanding even more unclear. How does this process work? Can it be made explicit? How are objectives defined? How are categories evaluated with respect to objectives?

All we were trying to do was to figure out what a game is? How did life get to be so complicated. Any six year old can tell you whether or not something is a game. And, yet, a philosophical adult has to admit defeat. Why is that? Well, David Hume will come to the rescue on this question and, in doing so, take a stab at the larger question. However, as we will see, Hume will jump into the muddied waters and stir up even more mud. Following that, Wittgenstein will show that once you are into muddied waters you can't get out. And that is what we will take up next.

Aristotle and the Notion of Purpose

A central element in Aristotle's metaphysics was the idea that in order to under stand a thing, you needed to understand four causes. This is a little confusing to the modern reader as the word 'cause' has taken on a slightly different meaning. However, if you think about it as 'important things to know' rather than causes, it makes a little more sense.

Aristotle believed that in order to understand a thing, you needed to understand its material cause (what is was made of), its efficient cause (how is got made), its formal cause (what it became), and its final cause (why it was made or what is was made for). Consider a table, for example. The material cause might be wood. It would be very different if it were made of ice, or putty, or sand. The efficient cause might be a craftsman, although it might also be a manufacturing process or a wood carving process. Each would produce a different result. The formal cause would, of course, be a table. However, the wood could have been used to make a boat, or a chair or any number of other things. Finally, no pun intended, we have the final cause, the purpose of table. A table is made to put things on. It could have been made for shade or protection. But the fact that it was made to place things on is an important aspect of a table.

This notion of final causes is central to Aristotle's view of of the world which we call teleological. This comes from two ancient Greek words 'telos' (far off or end state) and 'logos' (rigorous understanding). When we say that we have a teleological understanding of a thing we are saying that we understand it in terms of its purpose.

Teleology was tossed out of physics by Galileo who said that you can understand astronomy without having to resort to any underlying purpose in the universe. This is probably true. But, teleology stayed out of other sciences as well, probably due to physics envy. And there are numerous places where it would be appropriate. For example, when you say that a turtle has a hard shell for protection, it is a teleological claim. Natural sciences other than physics and chemistry are filled with teleological claims.

Taking this a step further, from natural science to social science, you have to ask whether or not it is possible to understand social science at all without referring to purposes. Certainly you cannot understand games without reference to their purpose. This is why Wittgenstein failed and Suit succeeded. But, again, we are getting ahead of ourselves. Next time we will follow the evolution of Aristotle's concept of universals and see why it ends in a train wreck.

Aristotle Points the Way to Destruction

Aristotle's view of universals was quite different from Plato's. Instead of relying on an immaterial World of the Forms, the ever practical Aristotle said that universals are formed simply by grouping things with the same attributes. Initially this seems to solve the problem of universals. Categories may not exist in the world, but things and their attributes do. So, if we just create categories from things with common attributes we are out of the woods as far as the problem of universals goes. Or, so it may seem.

If we try to define the attributes that all games have in common we begin to see how naive this position really is. In fact, Locke, Hume and Wittgenstein will carry this perspective to the point where it seems like knowledge is impossible. And Wittgenstein will use the case of game in particular to show this. Aristotle's approach seems to work pretty well on natural objects like plants and animals. And this makes sense, when you think about it, because, presumably, these things evolved from common ancestors by developing new attributes that distinguished them. Organizing them into categories and even taxonomies is largely an exercise in mapping out their evolutionary changes.

But, not all categories involve natural objects. In fact, most categories involve artificial objects (like games). And artificial objects do not have the benefit of natural evolution to sort them into categories. Unfortunately, Aristotle is leading us down the path to destruction with this view. And the aforementioned great minds will escort us the rest of the way.

But, before we dismiss Aristotle and his wayward ways, we need to consider the fact that he offered a different perspective which will put us back on the path to understanding. This is he notion of teleology which give us great purchase in understanding artificial objects. And that we will take up next.

Plato and the Form of Game

Looking out my window again and seeing a tree, I might ask "is this thing a tree because it is a member of the set of trees, or is it a member of the set of trees because it is a tree?" In fact, Plato wondered this as well. Is category membership derived from essence? Or, is essence derived from category membership? Are the particulars in a category because they are all the 'same' thing? Or do we consider them the 'same' thing because they are all members of the same category?

Plato believed that categories were determined by essence. We recognize a tree as a tree because there is a universal concept of 'treeness'. And even though each individual tree is an imperfect copy of that template, we can still recognize the tree as an instance of that ideal. This sounds pretty good until we ask where did that universal concept of treeness come from? And, trying to answer that, Plato gets into a lot of trouble.

Plato believed in a World of Forms (or templates or ideals) where all of these categories exist independent of the material world. But, he got into trouble trying to explain where this World of Forms came from and how we access it to recognize things like trees. You can have a lot of fun at Plato's expense over this. Plato believed that this World of Forms was somehow more real than the material world which was just an imperfect copy of the Forms. He beleived that the World of Forms was eternal. He believed that you had knowledge of this world prior to being born, but the trauma of birth made you forget it all. So, you spent your life remembering bits of it. This led him to say that you never really learn anything, you only remember things. You can go on and on and have a good chuckle at Plato's expense over this. However, once you have given it some serious thought, you probably have to admit that Plato was right. He didn't get the mechanics down, but the notion of ideal concepts does seem to hold up.

If you forget about immaterial worlds where forms reside and focus instead on intellectual economy and the pursuit of knowledge then it does seem to be the case that there are ideal definitions for concepts. If a thing has an essense and the category is defined based upon that essence then we have achieved the greatest intellectual economy possibl in the organization of our knowledge. These forms do not exist in some immaterial world. They exist in our minds when they are well organized. And organizing our minds well gives us the greatest purchase on the pursuit of knowledge.

A quick example can illustrate this. Consider the Periodic Chart of Elements. Organizing elements based on the number of electrons provides great intellectual economy. Just how far would chemistry be today if the Periodic Chart contained elements like creek water and tree sap. How far would medicine get if the body were made of blood, phlegm and bile? How far would psychology get if personalities were made up of introversion/extroversion,... well I am digressing.

So, back to the topic at hand, there must be an ideal form of game. If we can find that ideal form, it will advance our understanding of games and how games relate to other universals such as happiness, productivity, personal growth, education, and the like. But, before we do that, we will have a major conceptual train wreck thanks to Wittgenstein. And that won't happen for several weeks yet. So stay tuned.

The Problem of Universals

If I look out my window, point at a thing and call it a tree, how did I know that this object is a tree? A simple answer might be "it looks like a tree". In fact there is a delightful line in Mark Twain's Diary of Adam and Eve to this effect:

"Entry in Adam’s diary:

Tuesday: Been examining the great waterfall. It is the finest thing on the estate, I think. The new creature [Eve] calls it Niagara Falls – why, I am sure I do not know. [She] Says it looks like Niagara falls. That is not a reason, it is mere waywardness and imbecility."

How can a thing 'look' like Niagara Falls. For that matter, how can a thing 'look' like a tree. What we are really saying is that we have been shown instances of trees in the past and this new thing is similar to those instances. But this observation does not get us very far. There is a general category called 'tree' and we believe that this object outside the window belongs to that category. But, where did that category come from? And, how do we know the thing we are pointing at belongs to that category?

The problem of getting from the individual occurrences of things in the world to the groups into which we organize them is known as The Problem of Universals. The things that make up the instances or occurrences in the world are known as particulars and the groups into which we organize them are known as universals.

Why is the problem of universals so important? Consider the definition of a triangle. It is a three sided geometric figure the sum of whose interior angles is 180 degrees. That is a great definition. All triangles are included and nothing is included that is not a triangle. And from such precise definitions whole fields of knowledge have been developed. Now consider what would happen if we defined a triangle to include other geometric objects such as polygons, and metaphorical uses such as a 'love triangle'. How far could geometry get with definitions like that? And that is the crux of the issue. Defining universals is at the very heart of how we develop our knowledge of the world. And without well defined universals, progress in discovering knowledge is seriously hampered.

Since this is such a crucial problem in the advancement of knowledge we are going to stay with it for a while. While it is tempting to just move on with our understanding of games, not getting the concept nailed down threatens anything we would do from this point on. It would be like saying, let's not bother pouring a concrete foundation for this house. Let's just start putting up the walls. Whether or not you fully grasp the Problem of Universals, I think you can easily see where the analogy would take you.

The Concept of Identity

How do we know when two things are the same thing? This question seems uselessly abstract until we consider the fact that our knowledge is organized around sameness. And if we do not know what we mean when we say two things are the same, it is not possible to develop or acquire knowledge. When we say that two things are both games, we are saying they have the same essence or arché, which, in turn, means certain things should be true about both of them. To push this further, all things called games should have the same essence and certain things should be true about all of them. Further, all games should be related in a consistent manner to other concepts such as enjoyment, pleasure or growth. This is how we organize our knowledge and organizing our knowledge around essences leads to greater intellectual economy.

The concept of identity is the metaphysical problem that we encounter when we attempt to establish sameness. There are, in fact, two quite different varieties of sameness: sameness of a thing over time and sameness of two distinct things. The first, sometimes called the persistence of identity, addresses the problems that arise when I say that I am the same person who graduated from college, lo so many years ago, even though that person was decades younger, much less wiser, and very different in so many ways. The second, usually called the problem of universals, addresses the problems that arise when we group things into categories. Where do those categories come from? With no intention of minimizing the first, we are going to consider the second over the next few posts. There are two reasons for this. First, we need to know what we mean by the term 'games' if we are going to study them seriously. And, second, 'games' have an important role in the development of our understanding of universals.

The Search for the Arché

Early pre Socratic philosophers were engaged in a quest to find the fundamental unchanging essence of which all things were made. They are sometimes referred to as the earth, air, fire and water philosophers as they, in turn, posited each of these as the most fundamental element. Their quest is sometimes referred to as The Search for the Arché from the ancient Greek word, Arché , meaning the beginning or first principle. We see this word in modern words such as archeology (study of the beginnings), archaic (belonging to the beginning), and monarchy (one first). We can take the word to mean the essence or underlying principle. And while the pre Socratics were looking for the underlying essence of all reality, we usually limit ourselves to the underlying essence of the particulars that make up a concept.

So, what does this have to do with games? We saw in the previous post that normal conversational usage of a word or concept (such as game) is inadequate for serious rigorous research. Included in the conversational usage of the term games are such disparate particulars such as sports games, games people play (social roles), and the game of life. If we wish to study games, we need to come up with a crisper definition. We want the concept of games to include only things that are essentially the same.

The reason for this is simple. If the particulars that we include in the concept of games are essentially the same then we should be able to describe attributes or properties that they all have in common and we should be able to identify regular relationships that these particulars have with particulars in another concept.

In order to do this we need to make sure that all of the particulars are essentially the same; that they have the same essence. Or, in simple terms, that the instances are all instances of the same thing. We need to find the arché of games in order to be sure they are all the same. But, what exactly do we mean when we say they are the 'same'. This question, which seems to be far to simple and obvious to even comment on, actually opens up one of the most perplexing ideas in metaphysics - the concept of identity. What do we mean when we say to things are the same? We will turn to that in the next post.

Idols of the Marketplace

In the last post, I asked the question - What is a Game? I mentioned Wittgenstein who said you really can't define a game and Suit who said you can. Let's take a step back and ask - Why does it matter? You have probably never had the experience where you used the word 'game' in a sentence and somebody interrupted you to ask - What is a game? We seem to get along just fine in our normal conversations using words like 'game' without actually defining them. And, if we need a definition there is always the dictionary. So why all the fuss and bother?

The answer is that in order to study something from the perspective of rigorous research the usual definitions and fuzzy understandings we carry about in our heads are not good enough. I will explain why this is later. But for now, I just need to draw a line between meanings used in conversational discourse and meaning used in research.

Francis Bacon, one of the philosphical fathers of modern science, discussed four illusions we suffer from that prevents us from advancing our knowledge. He called these illusions 'Idols' and one of these 'Idols of the Marketplace' is on point here. 'Idols of the Marketplace' refers to the fact that the terms we use in normal conversations (e.g. when chatting in the marketplace) are simply too poorly defined to advance scientific understanding.

Taking a step beyond Bacon, I would point out that the purpose of casual discource is not the advancement of knowledge. The purpose of casual discourse is social bonding. And social bonding is easier to achieve if we blur distinctions rather than sharpening them. Hence, in casual conversation we may use the word 'game' in a wide variety of imprecise ways such as 'games people play', 'the game of life', 'gaming the system', 'playing the game to get promoted' and so on. However, for the purposes of research we must refine our definitions. We need precise definitions that refer to precise categories and all of the instances of those categories should have the same essence.

The same essence.... What does that mean? Well, perhaps we can take that up next time.

What Is a Game?

I always like to begin an inquiry into a new area by looking at the philosophical underpinnings. This usually identifies the major issues and provides a framework for interpreting higher level claims and disputes. There are two ways to approach this. One is by trying to find out what some of my favorite philosophers have said on the topic. The other is to attempt to understand the key concepts in the new field of inquiry. One might say - "Hey! This is video games we are talking about here. What philosophical grounding might there possibly be?" But, speaking with the confidence of some one who has done this many times, I can say with surety that there are philosophical underpinning to everything. You just need to know where to look.

In this post, I am going to sketch out the philosophical foundations and where I think they will lead. Over the next few posts, I will explore the philosophical issues in more detail. If philosophy gives you a headache or puts you to sleep, you may want to come back in a month. By then, I should have the foundations all laid out and be ready to more on to less arcane issues.

When we ask the question - What is a Game? - we are inquiring as to the meaning of a concept. A concept is an abstraction of particular things in our experience that we group together for the sake of intellectual economy. How we get from these particular things to the concepts in which we group them is the central problem of metaphysics; a problem known as the problem of universals. Many revered philosophers include Plato and Aristotle have commented on this problem. More recently, Ludwig Wittgenstein chipped in with a damaging critique of the problem of universals by saying that the particulars things grouped together in a concept might not actually have any specific set of things in common. This is a damning critique, because, if Wittgenstein is correct, then knowledge is not possible. And the example he used was -- Games! So, as I began this inquiry, I thought I would start with Wittgenstein and the apparent impossibility of defining games.

However, in pursuing this, I came across another related work by Bernard Suits called The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia in which Suits defies Wittgenstein by defining the concept of a game. According to Suits "playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles" Well!! It doesn't get any better than this. On one hand we have one of the greatest philosophical minds of the 20th century claiming that you cannot define a game. On the other hand you have some guy I never heard of providing what appears to be a perfectly serviceable definition. As we attempt to unravel this apparent contradiction we will learn a little metaphysics and a lot about games.